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Discrimination Claims: The Right Tools for the Job
Handicapped persons1 are relative newcomers to the protection offered by
employment discrimination statutes.2 Although they now have achieved wide
recognition as a class requiring such protection,3 their status as protected per-
sons is not on a parity with that of persons claiming that they have been dis-
criminated against on the basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, or age.
4
Moreover, analysis of handicap employment discrimination cases presents two
unique considerations. First, while it is ordinarily easy to determine that a
claimant is black, or female, or of foreign origin, or Jewish, or of a certain age,
it is not always clear that a claimant is legally handicapped. 5 Second, in many
cases a handicapped person can be employed successfully only if the employer
is willing in some way to accommodate the person's handicap.6 Although such
accommodation is superficially analogous to other types of affirmative action,7
1. "Handicapped persons" appears to be the accepted designation for the class under discus-
sion. See THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS 1-10 (R. Burgdorf, Jr. ed. 1980) [herein-
after cited as LEGAL RIGHTS] (an argument can be made that "disabled persons" is preferable).
Handicapped persons have been referred to by a number of degrading terms. See id. at 4. The
choice of words used to identify the class, therefore, is a matter of some importance, especially
when treating antidiscrimination laws, which are designed in part to dispel prejudice. The temp-
tation to shorten the designation merely to "the handicapped" should be resisted because handi-
capped persons frequently feel that their individuality is ignored, and that labeling them "the
handicapped" is depersonalizing. See id. at 48.
2. By 1974, 10 years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress had prohibited both pub-
lic- and private-sector employment discrimination based on race, sex, religion, and national ori-
gin, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and, seven years after the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Congress had similarly prohibited such dis-
crimination based on age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congress, however, had
enacted only limited legislation protecting the rights of handicapped persons. See Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Less than half of the states had
"amended existing anti-discrimination laws to require equal employment opportunity for the dis-
abled in both the public and private sectors." LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 331-32.
Indeed, Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth (PARC), 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), is often seen as "[tihe start of [the] litigative movement" on behalf of handi-
capped persons, although it was not the first lawsuit brought by a handicapped person. LEGAL
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 52. The case was "a major, statewide class action supported by a state
organization," and "placed in the public eye, for the first time, the notion that the courts could be
used to secure constitutional and statutory rights for handicapped persons." Id.
3. See infra notes 25 & 34-35 and accompanying text.
4. See supra note 2 (protection afforded handicapped persons under federal law more lim-
ited). See also infra notes 25-26 (scope of federal law limited); infra notes 35-38 and accompany-
ing text (state laws offer inadequate protection).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 39-125 (litigation may center on whether person with
disability is legally handicapped).
6. A person in a wheelchair, for example, may be able to perform a clerical job but unable
to use the company's restrooms unless they are modified. See LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 317.
For a discussion of what accommodation entails, see infra text accompanying notes 138-40.
7. All types of affirmative action require the employers to give protected classes preferential
treatment. See generally Sowell, Weber and Bakke and 7he Presuppositions of '4f rmative Ac-
tion," 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1309 (1980).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
it differs in critical respects. The underlying rationale of affirmative action
plans aimed at racial and sexual job discrimination, for instance, is to elimi-
nate longstanding and deep-seated prejudice through temporary remedial hir-
ing. The theory is that integrating blacks and women into the work force will
give them the opportunity to prove themselves and acquire skills that will
eventually remove obstacles to their employment.8 While some objections to
hiring handicapped persons undoubtedly derive from prejudice, 9 some are
based on the rational fear that handicapped persons will prove unable to per-
form their jobs adequately.' 0 Accommodation plans must take into account
the unique characteristics of individual handicaps, which present almost infi-
nite variety." Moreover, while affirmative action plans, whether based on
race, gender, or handicap, may in the long run serve to dispel prejudice, and
thus become obsolete, accommodation plans are designed to adapt a given job
to a real disability that will persist even after prejudice is eliminated. Hence,
because accommmodation plans cannot eliminate the handicaps themselves,
they cannot be viewed as a temporary remedial expedient.
The unique problems posed by handicap employment discrimination
must be identified clearly if it is to be remedied. Recognition of these
problems would provide guidance to Congress and state legislatures in draft-
ing antidiscrimination statutes, and to courts in interpreting them. At present,
despite a wide variety of statutory and case law aimed at handicap employ-
ment discrimination,12 no uniform antidiscrimination policy has emerged. On
the contrary, at both the federal and state level, circular analytic models are
developing that short-circuit consideration of the crucial issues13 and promote
widespread confusion.14 This comment explores the fallacies inherent in these
developing models, and suggests instead a linear mode of analysis through
which it can be rationally determined both whether handicap employment dis-
crimination has occurred and whether an employer should be required to ac-
8. See id. at 1310-11 (affirmative action requires consequences of past activity, such as
word-of-mouth hiring practices, to be proscribed or mitigated, but is transitional policy).
9. See LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 318 ("employers continue to discriminate against
handicapped job applicants because of stereotypes, prejudices, and misconceptions").
10. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (nursing-school
applicant refused admission because handicap might threaten safety of patients); Boynton Cab
Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 96 Wis. 2d 396, 291 N.W.2d 850
(1980) (one-handed taxicab driver refused employment because handicap might prevent safe op-
eration of vehicle).
11. The problem of accommodating a mentally retarded person is obviously quite different
from that of accommodating a person of normal intelligence who is confined to a wheelchair.
Handicap, moreover, may be a matter of degree. A visual handicap, for example, may range from
minor, such as vision impaired but correctable with glasses, see Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979), to major, such as total blindness, see Zorick v. Tynes,
372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1979).
12. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 25-38.
13. See infra note 15.
14. Because there is no widely accepted method of analyzing handicap employment discrimi-
nation cases, those presenting similar fact situations and arising under nearly identical statutes




commodate a handicapped person's disability.' 5
Two issues that may be central to the enforcement of handicap legislation
are beyond the scope of this comment, largely because they do not yet appear
to have assumed real significance. First, this paper does not address methods
of proving that handicap discrimination is the motive for job denial. Case law
indicates that most employers freely admit they have refused employment be-
cause they consider the applicant handicapped.1 6 As employers become more
15. The federal analytic model is based on the Supreme Court's reading of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), in Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Under this analysis, an "otherwise qualified" hand-
icapped person may not be denied employment solely on the basis of handicap unless the
handicap impairs job performance, in which case the person is not "an otherwise qualified handi-
cap individual." Id See infra text accompanying notes 144-70. The state analytic model derives
from the North Carolina Supreme Court's reading of that state's handicap employment antidis-
crimination statute, N.C. GN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982), in Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979). Using this analysis, a handicapped person may be denied
employment on the basis of handicap only if the handicap impairs job performance, unless the
handicap has been overcome or outlived, in which case the person is not legally handicapped. See
infra text accompanying notes 64-97. Both analyses focus on whether plaintiff may claim the
protection of the law, not on whether he has suffered unreasonable employment discrimination.
Contrast those lines of reasoning with the proposed analytic model diagrammed below.
Under this analysis, the first question is whether a bias against a handicapping condition moti-
vated the employer. The second question is whether that bias is reasonably based on evidence
that the handicap would impair job performance. In jurisdictions that do not require accommo-
dation, see infra note 131, the analysis would end with the second step. In jurisdictions that do
require accommodation, see infra notes 132-33, the analytic model would compel an examination
and balancing of the employer's and the handicapped person's interests. In either case, the model
operates to require that a case be resolved on the merits, rather than on the issue of standing.
STEP 1: Is Handicap Basis
for Job Denial?
YES Nb ) PLAINTIFF LOSES
STEP 2: Does Handicap
Impair Job Performance?
Y S NO ) PLAINTIFF WINS
STEP 3: Is Accommodation
In Any Way Possible?
I Nb ) PLAINTIFF LOSES
STEP 4: Would Safety
Hazards Be Overcome?
Y tS K _ N ) PLAINTIFF LOSES
STEP 5: Is Accommodation
Either Unreasonable or
Unduly Burdensome?
S NO . PLAINTIFF WINS
PLAINTIFF LOSES
16. See, eg., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (hearing im-
pairment reason for refusing nursing-school applicant); Wisconsin Dairy Equip. Co. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 95 Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980) (missing
kidney reason for denying job to man functioning normally); Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979) (glaucoma reason for refusing job to man with 20/20
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aware that handicap employment discrimination is forbidden by law, they
may develop more sophisticated rationales for denying jobs. At that point, the
law may develop along lines suggested by cases arising under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 The Supreme Court has interpreted that statute to
forbid not only intentional discrimination but also de facto discrimination
(when it results in a disparate impact on a protected class),' 8 and has devel-
oped methods of proving either.' 9 Second, class-wide affirmative action plans
have not become a significant issue in the field of handicap employment dis-
crimination.20 Although an employer's policies may discriminate equally
against all persons with a given type of handicap,21 they may have no impact
at all on persons with different types of handicaps. 22 It would be extremely
difficult, therefore, to fashion an enforceable affirmative action plan designed
to eradicate discrimination against all handicapped persons as a class.
I. DEFINING HANDICAP
For nearly two decades, federal law has prohibited both public- and pri-
vate-sector employment discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, and
religion.23 For almost as long, employers have been forbidden to discriminate
on the basis of age.24 Not until 1973, however, did Congress prohibit employ-
corrected vision); Zorick v. Tynes, 372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1979) (blindness reason for refusing job to
man with good credentials).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
18. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (disparate treatment pro-
hibited); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact also may be
prohibited).
19. If plaintiff alleges intentional discrimination, but lacks overt evidence, he may establish a
prima facie violation of Title VII by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he
was qualified for and applied for the job; (3) he was rejected; and (4) the employer continued
seeking applicants with the same or similar qualifications. In defense, the employer may articu-
late a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying employment, which the plaintiff may rebut
with evidence of circumstances or statistics which indicate that the employer's articulated reason is
a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But see
Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981) (disparate treatment analysis
held inapplicable to Rehabilitation Act because handicap discrimination is particularly invidious).
A plaintiff may also establish a prima facie violation of Title VII by showing, ordinarily
through statistics, that the employer has engaged in a facially neutral employment practice that
has a disparate impact on the protected class. The employer may justify the disparate impact by
showing that the challenged practice is a business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). Plaintiff may rebut this showing with evidence that other selection devices without
disparate impact would serve the employer's interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship"
equally well. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
20. Although federal law, in some circumstances, requires employers to take affirmative ac-
tion to hire handicapped persons, see infra note 25, litigation has centered not on what steps
employers must take, but on whether employees have a private right of action. See, e.g., Davis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2045 (1982); Simon v.
St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1485 (1982); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
21. See, e.g., Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979)
(employer denied jobs to all with glaucoma, without considering severity of disease).
22. Eliminating a policy of refusing employment to all persons with glaucoma, for example,
would have no effect on discrimination against those with epilepsy or mental retardation.
23. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
24. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) (employment discrimination prohibited against persons age 40-70).
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ment discrimination based on handicap.25 Even today, federal law leaves
handicapped persons largely unprotected from private-sector employment dis-
crimination.26 Repeated efforts to bring handicapped persons within the am-
bit of the Civil Rights Act have failed.27 Moreover, given the current
popularity of the states' rights concept,28 it appears unlikely that either Con-
gress or the federal courts29 will expand the protection offered handicapped
persons in the near future. Their best hope for equal employment opportunity
thus lies at present in working to clarify and strengthen state legislation.
30
25. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Reha-
bilitation Act was intended primarily to help states develop and implement vocational rehabilita-
tion services for handicapped persons. See id. § 701 (statement of purpose). The Act, however,
does address employment in limited circumstances. Section 791 requires the federal government
to take affirmative action to hire handicapped persons. See also id. § 794a (Supp. V 1981). Sec-
tion 793 requires persons contracting with the federal government for more than $2,500 to take
affirmative action to employ and promote "qualified handicapped individuals." Under § 794, re-
cipients of federal financial assistance may not discriminate against "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individuals." Affirmative action is not mentioned.
26. Federal law prohibiting employment discrimination against handicapped persons does
not reach most private employers because it applies only to the federal government, federal con-
tractors, and recipients of federal financial assistance. See supra note 25.
27. Erf, Potluck Protection for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII to
Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis ofDisability, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 814, 835 (1977). The exclu-
sion of handicap discrimination from Title VII has meant that the bulk of civil rights employment
litigation is not directly applicable to handicap cases. Because classes protected under Title VII
have not been forced to resort to state fair-employment legislation, the latter has been utilized only
recently. Id. at 837.
28. "Today a new body of constitutional law is emerging based not on the Constitution of the
United States but on the constitutions of several states. Indeed, a clear trend toward states' rights
is bringing about a phoenix-like resurrection of federalism." Mosk, Redicovering the 10th 4mend-
ment, 20 JUDGES J. 16 (Fall 1981).
29. To establish a violation of constitutional rights granted under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, or under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), passed pursuant to the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment, a
handicapped plaintiff must show that his injury flows from state action. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1 ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person ... equal protection of the laws."). See Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation
Ctr., 590 F.2d 87, 90 (4th Cir. 1978) (handicapped person must show private employer's conduct
"was in reality an act of either the state or federal government"). Thus, even if handicap were
held to be a "suspect" basis for governmental classifications, as is race, see, e.g., Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), or if employment were held to be a "fundamental" right, as is the
right to marry, id at 12, laws affecting the employment rights of handicapped persons would be
subjected to "rigid scrutiny," id at 11, only in cases involving state action.
Nonetheless, the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment empowers Congress "to pass
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States." Id at 11. Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which
was passed pursuant to that power, protects "the right to contract for employment," Jones v. Al-
fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,441 n.78 (1968). The Court held that § 1981 extended to private
acts of discrimination as well as state action in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Al-
though § 1981 literally protects the same contractual rights "as [are] enjoyed by white citizens," 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), it has been held that the statute's scope is not limited to racial discrimina-
tion. See Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1970). But see Trehan v. IBM, 24
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (cited in McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-Oriented
Employment Screening, 59 TEx. L. REV. 999, 1023 n.104 (1981) (§ 1981 held not applicable to
national origin). It has been suggested that § 1981 could be used to enforce handicapped persons'
employment rights in the private sector. See Note, Abroad in the Land.- Legal Strategies to Effec-
tuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1514-19 (1973). This approach,
however, remains untested. LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 437.
30. For a detailed accounting of existing state fair employment practice laws, see 3 EMPL.
PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 20,000-29,335 (1981).
19841
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The primary concern of this comment, therefore, is state legislation and
its attendant case law. The states, however, frequently look to federal statutes
and case law for guidance in resolving handicap discrimination problems.
31
Proving particularly influential is the federal Rehabilitation Act definition of
handicapped individual: "[a]ny person who (a) has a physical or mental im-
pairment which substantially limits such person's functioning in one or more
of such person's major life activities; (b) has a record of such an impairment;
or (c) is regarded as having such an impairment. ' 32 Federal law also requires
employers to make reasonable accommodation to an employee's handicap.
33
Hence it is important, in analyzing state statutes and decisions, to keep in
mind the federal law backdrop.
At present, forty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted
provisions forbidding handicap discrimination in employment.34 The state
legislation, however, "is highly varied, often uncertain, and inadequately en-
forced,"'35 and the protection this legislation provides has aptly been described
as "potluck."'36 Most of the difficulties with existing state legislation can be
categorized in one of two ways: either the definition of handicap is so vague or
so restrictive that many persons needing protection are denied it altogether;37
or the law fails to address adequately (or at all) the issue of accommodation. 38
Turning to the first of these difficulties, twelve states at present do not
define handicap at all;3 9 definitions in the remaining states vary and produce
31. See, e.g., Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461 (1979)
(state's administrative regulations tracked language of Rehabilitation Act; court judicially adopted
federal definition of "handicapped individual"). Cf. Zorick v. Tynes, 372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1979)
(court followed federal lead in refusing to hold for plaintiff under federal cause of action, but
employed unique method of analysis to resolve state claim in plaintiff's favor).
32. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added),
33. The duty to accommodate does not appear in § 503 or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), but is imposed by OFCCP and HEW guidelines. See
Affirmative Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors for Handicapped Workers, 41 C.F.R.
§§ 60-741.2, .6(d) (1983) (OFCCP); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and
Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k)(1), .12
(1983) (HEW).
34. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, SELECTED STATE AND
FED. LAWS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT AND CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 68-
80 (1980) (only North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wyoming and Puerto Rico pro-
vide no coverage) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED LAWS].
35. Erf, supra note 27, at 844. See SELECTED LAWS, supra note 34, at 35 (mentally handi-
capped persons protected in 22 states; cancer patients covered only in California; private employ-
ers must comply in 35 states and District of Columbia; 30 states, not including North Carolina,
have enforcement agencies; private right of action expressly created in only 10 states and District
of Columbia; remedies may be preliminary injunctions, cease-and-desist orders, monetary dam-
ages, reinstatement, hiring, back pay, criminal penalties; limited priority in government hiring
only in New York; affirmative-action requirements vary widely).
36. Erf, supra note 27, at 814.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 64-125.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 126-301.
39. See Hartstein, Employment of the Handicapped under State Law-An Employer's Perspec-
tive (presentation at A.B.A. Labor Section Committee meeting in Sarasota, Fla., March 5-6, 1981),
reprinted in 45 DAILY LAB. REP. E-4, E-5 n.9 (1981) ("[S]tates with no definition are Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Vermont, and Virginia. Washington and Wisconsin also have no definition by statute but
have developed definitions by regulation and case law, respectively.").
[Vol. 62
HANDICA4P DISCRIMINA4TION
dramatically different degrees of protection.40 A number of states use the fed-
eral standard,4 1 which has the advantage of protecting against some of the
most irrational forms of discrimination---discrimination against those who
merely have a record of handicap or are perceived as having a handicap, but
are not in fact handicapped. 42 Coverage for these categories is controversial,
43
but indefensible results may be reached in states that do not provide it.44 Also
controversial is a category of handicaps labeled "voluntary"; 45 exclusion from
coverage of this category can likewise lead to indefensible results.
46
Several courts have confronted the question whether "perceived" handi-
caps are protected by statutes that do not expressly mention them. In Barnes v.
Washington Natural Gas. Co. ,47 for example, an employee was discharged be-
cause the employer erroneously believed that he had epilepsy.48 Defending
against the ensuing charge of handicap discrimination, the employer main-
tained that the employee had no cause of action under the state handicap em-
ployment discrimination statute49 because he did not in fact have epilepsy,
and therefore had no standing to sue as a handicapped person.50 Rejecting
that argument, the Washington Court of Appeals observed:
It would be an anomalous situation if discrimination in employment
would be prohibited against those who possess the handicap but
would not include within the class a person "perceived" by the em-
ployer to have the handicap. . . . The essence of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination is the application of unreasonable
generalizations about people to the hiring, promotion and discharge
of workers.
51
Recognizing that antidiscrimination legislation must mean, if it means any-
thing at all, that it is unlawful to discriminate on purely irrational grounds, the
Barnes court in effect judicially adopted52 the federal Rehabilitation Act defi-
nition of "handicapped individual," which forbids discrimination against
those with "perceived" handicaps. 53 Although the Washington legislature had
40. See id at E-5 & nn.5-8 (definitions range from the broad federal standard to "substantial
impairment" standards).
41. See id at E-5 n.5 (states with definition comparable to Rehabilitation Act standard in-
clude California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, and Washington).
42. Under the federal standard, persons who merely have a record of having a handicap, or
are perceived to have a handicap, are considered legally handicapped. See supra text accompany-
ing note 32.
43. See Hartstein, supra note 39, at E-5.
44. See, e.g., Burgess v. Schlitz Brewery Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979) (man with
glaucoma denied job although vision corrected to 20/20 and job performance unimpaired).
45. See Hartstein, supra note 39, at E-6.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 106-13.
47. 22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461 (1979).
48. Id at 577, 591 P.2d at 462.
49. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60 (1974).
50. See Barnes, 22 Wash. App. at 580, 591 P.2d at 463-64.
51. Id at 582, 591 P.2d at 464.
52. See id at 582-83, 591 P.2d at 465.
53. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976).
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not included the federal definition in its antidiscrimination statute,54 the
Barnes court derived support for its position from administrative regulations
that suggested the federal definition was appropriate.55
-A similar result was reached in Dairy Equipment Co. v. Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Industry, Labor and Human Relations. 56 Plaintiffs job application
was denied because he had only one kidney.57 The employer argued that be-
cause the man functioned normally, he could not be considered handicapped
within the meaning of the state statute,58 and was therefore not a proper plain-
tiff.59 In holding that unlawful discrimination had occurred,60 the court relied
both on a finding by the state's enforcement agency that plaintiff should be
considered handicapped, 61 and on a state case-law history that had tradition-
ally afforded broad protection to handicapped workers. 62 The state statute,
however, did not articulate the principle that those who are merely treated as
if they were handicapped should be protected as fully as if they indeed were
disabled.
63
Taken together, these decisions seem to indicate that it is unnecessary to
include the federal definition of "handicapped individual" within state statutes
because a common sense approach to statutory construction achieves the same
result. That is unfortunately not always the case. A North Carolina decision,
Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. ,64 illustrates the point. In Burgess the
complainant had glaucoma. 65 "[Clompetent medical authority"66 informed
Schlitz that "plaintiff's glaucoma would in no way interfere with plaintiffs job
performance and that in fact plaintiff had 20/20 vision in both eyes with
glasses." 67 Under the relevant state statute, a handicapped person could be
denied employment on the basis of handicap only if that handicap would im-
pair job performance.68 Burgess's job application was nonetheless rejected be-
cause "it was against [company] policy to hire individuals who had
glaucoma. '' 69 Despite a lower-court decision basically in accord with Barnes
and Dairy Equipment,70 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that although
54. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.030, 49.60.180 (1974) (statute contains no definition of
handicap).
55. See Barnes, 22 Wash. App. at 579, 591 P.2d at 463 (opinion sets out agency regulations).
56. 95 Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980).
57. See id at 321, 290 N.W.2d at 331.
58. See Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-111.37 (1975).
59. Dairy Equpment, 95 Wis. 2d at 325, 290 N.W.2d at 333.
60. See id at 331-33, 290 N.W.2d at 336-37.
61. See id at 323-25, 290 N.W.2d at 332.
62. See id at 327-30, 290 N.W.2d at 334-35.
63. See Wis. STAT. § 11 1.32(5)(a) (1975) (statute includes no definition of handicap).
64. 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
65. Id at 521, 259 S.E.2d at 250.
66. Id
67. Id
68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982): "Handicapped persons shall be employed.., on
the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the particular disability
impairs the performance of the work involved."
69. Burgess, 298 N.C. at 521, 259 S.E.2d at 250.
70. See Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 39 N.C. App. 481, 486, 250 S.E.2d 687, 690
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glaucoma is a "visual disability" covered by the state's antidiscrimination leg-
islation,7 1 Burgess was not disabled by the disease and therefore not protected
by the statute.72 Indicating that a "corrected" handicap was unprotected, the
court held: "Essentially plaintiff has indicated. . . that he has an eye disease
but that his vision is functioning normally with glasses. Accordingly ...
plaintiff is not visually disabled within the meaning of the statute."73
In reaching this decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court ignored the
lower court's implicit approval of the federal Rehabilitation Act definition of
disabled persons. 74 Faced with construing for the first time the state's handi-
cap employment discrimination statute,75 the court announced it would honor
two widely accepted principles of statutory construction. First, "[a] construc-
tion which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be
avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative lan-
guage"; 76 and second, a remedial statute, such as the handicap employment
discrimination law, "should be construed liberally, in a manner which assures
fulfillment of the beneficial goals for which it is enacted and which brings
within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope." 77 To these princi-
ples, the court added that "the words and phrases of a statute must be inter-
preted contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the other provisions
of the statute and which gives effect to the reason and purpose of the
statute."
78
Embarking on this contextual study, however, the Burgess court failed to
discern the purposes underlying the handicap employment provision, purposes
revealed not only by the provision itself but also by the introductory language
setting forth the general purpose of all of the state's handicap protection legis-
lation.79 These two provisions, taken together, identify three interests the law
is designed to protect. As the following analysis will demonstrate, none of the
three is advanced by the court's holding.
Two of the three interests are implicit in the employment discrimination
statute, which provides that "[h]andicapped persons shall be employed. . . on
the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the
particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved."80 These
words simultaneously protect and limit the interests of both handicapped
(1979) (court of appeals found Schlitz violated antidiscrimination statute and observed that it was
apparent that Schlitz viewed Burgess "as being under some type of disability').
71. See Burgess, 298 N.C. at 527, 259 S.E.2d at 253.
72. Id at 528, 259 S.E.2d at 253.
73. Id
74. See Burgess, 39 N.C. App. at 485-86, 250 S.E.2d at 690 (court of appeals quoted Rehabili-
tation Act definition of "handicapped individuals," apparently with approval).
75. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982) (handicapped persons are those with "physical,
mental and visual disabilities").
76. Burgess, 298 N.C. at 524, 259 S.E.2d at 251.
77. Id
78. Id
79. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982).
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workers and employers. While the employer's interest in total hiring discre-
tion ordinarily must yield to the handicapped person's autonomy interest, if
the handicapped person cannot perform a job as well as the ablebodied, his
interest must yield to the employer's interest. Thus the provision identifies the
handicapped person's interest in being free from arbitrary employment dis-
crimination and the employer's interest in being free to refuse employment to
those unable to offer him unimpaired job performance. Moreover, the statute
appears to weigh the handicapped person's interest slightly more heavily, plac-
ing on the employer the burden of proving as an affirmative defense that the
handicap impairs job performance. The statute does not require the handi-
capped person to show that his handicap does not impair job performance.
The third interest is derived from the legislature's introductory recital of
purpose: "The State shall encourage and enable handicapped persons to par-
ticipate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in
remunerative employment." 81 To the interests of the handicapped person and
of the employer, these words add an interest of the state itself. As a general
proposition, the state has an interest in encouraging full citizenship for all per-
sons because it promotes a healthy society. The reference in the statute to
"remunerative employment," however, suggests a more specific interest.
Clearly, chronic unemployment casts a burden on the state as well as on the
unemployed. Some persons are so severely handicapped that the cost of car-
ing for them will inevitably devolve upon the state, but the state has a strong
self-interest in avoiding that result whenever possible.
A fourth interest should be added to this list, that of the judiciary, and
hence, indirectly, of the state, in avoiding frivolous "nuisance" suits. This in-
terest is not explicitly identified by the statutory language, but it can be in-
ferred. Handicap legislation of course is not designed primarily to create a
class of handicapped persons, but rather to create protections for those per-
sons. It would little avail a person to be classified as legally handicapped if no
protection flowed from that status. Presumably the Burgess court felt that the
purpose of the statute could not be respected if persons whom the legislature
did not intend to protect were able to claim relief under the law, and that
extending protection to "perceived" handicaps would expose the court to a
flood of meritless claims.
82
81. Id § 168-1.
82. This presumption is an inference. The court's language throughout the opinion, until the
final few paragraphs, suggests the court believed the legislature intended to grant rights to the
handicapped "in the broadest possible terms." Burgess, 298 N.C. at 524, 259 S.E.2d at 25 1. In-
deed, the logical momentum of the opinion seems to favor the plaintiff. The early pages are
devoted to an expansion of the lower-court opinion, in which the court rejected defendant's argu-
ment that the state statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982), was applicable only to those who were
"totally blind or those whose vision with glasses is so defective as to prevent the performance of
ordinary activity for which eyesight is essential." Id § rn-11 ( 978) (statute defining "visually
handicapped"). See Burgess, 39 N.C. App. 481, 250 S.E.2d 687 (court of appeals held definition of
"visually handicapped" should not be applied to limit meaning of "visual disability" in § 168-6);
Burgess, 298 N.C. 520,259 S.E. 2d 248 (supreme court agreed with court of appeals' construction),
Unexpectedly, however, the supreme court held that while Burgess need not be "visually handi-
capped" to be protected by the employment statute, he must be "visually disabled," id at 528, 259
S.E.2d at 253, by which the court meant that he must suffer from a "present, non-correctable loss
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Taking in sequence the interests of the handicapped person, the employer,
the state, and the judiciary, it is apparent at the outset that the handicapped
person's interest in being free from arbitrary employment discrimination is not
advanced by the Burgess decision. The Burgess court failed to recognize this
because it focused on the meaning of "handicapped" rather than on the mean-
ing of unlawful discrimination.83 Concededly, the legislature's definition of
handicapped persons---"those. . with physical, mental and visual disabili-
ties" 84 -was imprecise. Because "handicap" and "disability" are arguably in-
terchangeable terms,85 the statutory definition is circular and gave the court
little guidance in identifying the protected class. Implicit in the statutory lan-
guage, however, is an adequate definition of the kind of discrimination the
legislature intended to outlaw. Such discrimination does not occur merely be-
cause an ablebodied person is preferred to a handicapped person; rather, it
takes place when an employer bases job denial on an abnormality that has not
been "shown"86 to "impair"87 the "performance of the work involved."88
This is precisely the kind of discrimination that Schlitz engaged in when it
rejected Burgess's job application. Because the statute is designed to prevent
this kind of discrimination, the Burgess decision defeats, to a significant extent,
the statutory purpose. Nor is the employer's legitimate interest in being able
to reject applicants who cannot offer unimpaired job performance advanced
by the decision. The employer's interest advanced is that of being able to deny
employment on the basis of an infirmity unrelated to job performance-pre-
cisely what the statute says an employer must not do.
The state's interest in minimizing unnecessary unemployment is also de-
feated by the Burgess decision. Burgess, in effect, creates a class of persons
who may be denied employment without cause and with legal impunity-
those whose handicaps, real or imagined, do not impair their functionifig in
any significant way.89 These are precisely the persons who do not belong on
the state's unemployment or welfare rolls; their presence there shamefully
wastes both their own productive capacities and the state's economic
resources.
The Burgess court did not closely examine any of these three primary
interests. Rather, it focused on the merely secondary and inferable interest of
of function" that "substantially" impaired his ability "to function normally." Id The court of-
fered no authority to support this construction.
83. See supra note 82.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982).
85. See LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 4-10 (dispute whether "handicapped" and "dis-
abled" have different meanings and connotations).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982).
87. Id
88. Id
89. The Burgess holding was not limited to persons claiming visual handicaps. The court
held that, as used in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982), "disability" of any kind "refers to a present,
non-correctable loss of function which substantially impairs a person's ability to function nor-
mally." Burgess, 298 N.C. at 528, 259 S.E.2d 253. Under this rationale, a person with a history of
a handicapping condition, or a person who erroneously was believed to have a handicapping
condition, would not be protected by the statute.
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preventing meritless claims. 90 This focus was misplaced. A decision for the
plaintiff would not have enhanced the possibility of nuisance suits. Such suits
could materialize in cases in which claimants who were denied employment
on the basis of lack of experience, for instance, claimed the real reason for job
denial was some trivial infirmity. In Burgess Schlitz openly admitted that
plaintiff was refused employment solely because he had glaucoma,9 1 and fur-
ther conceded that his glaucoma would not impair job performance. 92 The
"real reason" for job denial was not in issue.93
The handicap employment statute construed by the Burgess court was
enacted in 1973. 94 Burgess is the only case arising under it ever to reach the
appellate level, and no case under the statute has proceeded to appellate judg-
ment on the merits. Three conclusions are possible: either there is no handi-
cap employment discrimination in North Carolina; all such discrimination is
resolved either privately or by trial courts to the satisfaction of the parties; or
handicapped persons are persuaded that the law, as it has been interpreted in
Burgess, affords them no meaningful protection. The first two conclusions
strain credulity. The third implies that Burgess made the antidiscrimination
statute a nullity.95
As Burgess demonstrates, a mode of judicial analysis that focuses on the
meaning of "handicap," and excludes from the protected class persons who
90. The court quoted various statutory provisions pertaining to handicapped persons, at
length and without comment, concluding that this "contextual" study revealed the scope of protec-
tion conferred by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982), and that extending protection to Burgess
"would exceed the intended scope." Burgess, 298 N.C. at 524-28, 259 S.E.2d at 252-53.
91. See Burgess, 298 N.C. at 521, 259 S.E.2d at 250.
92. See Appellants Brief at 2, Burgess, 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (defendant based mo-
tion to dismiss on plaintiffs claim that his glaucoma "would in no way interfere" with his job
performance).
93. Indeed, it seems permissible to infer that Schlitz was resisting the concept of the handicap
employment discrimination statute. The record does not suggest that Schlitz was attempting to
comply in good faith with what it perceived to be the meaning and scope of the statute. On the
contrary, defendant conceded that "unfortunately" the statute appeared to imply a private right of
action. Appellant's Brief at 9, Burgess, 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248. The statute itself specifies
neither civil remedies nor criminal penalties. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982). Moreover,
North Carolina has no enforcement agency designated to bring or hear cases arising under the
statute. See suera note 35. Unless handicapped persons were allowed to bring suit, there would
be no mechamsm to enforce the statute, and an unenforceable statute has little significance be-
yond a bare articulation of public policy. Defendant indicated, however, that it would prefer to
argue that the statute was indeed unenforceable, but had been unable to discover legal support for
that position. See Appellant's Brief at 9, Burgess, 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (all available
authority indicated plaintiff must be allowed to bring suit). Defendant was not, in other words,
concerned with avoiding a nuisance suit, but rather with prohibiting any suit at all. When this
broadside attack on the statutory purpose appeared doomed, Schlitz settled for an end-run: deny-
ing plaintiff standing.
For a discussion of the problems handicapped plaintiffs have encountered in attempting to
bring a private lawsuit in employment discrimination cases arising under federal law, see Wegner,
The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered- Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Hand-
icap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (to be published in 69 CORNELL L. REv.
(1984)).
94. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168-I to -10 (1982).
95. A fourth possibility is that handicapped persons are simply unaware of the statute and
the protection it offers. It stands to reason, however, that if on even one occasion the statute had
furnished a handicapped person with effective protection, it would have received greater publicity
and, as a result, would have been used more often.
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are not substantially impaired, results in a circular line of reasoning96 which
both misses and defeats the point of antidiscrimination legislation. Under this
ill-conceived analysis, a person denied employment on the basis of a handicap
that does not impair job performance may sue for relief unless he has over-
come or outlived his handicap, in which case he may be denied employment
on the basis of a handicap that does not impair job performance, and may not
sue for relief. This model could make it virtually impossible to maintain a
charge of handicap employment discrimination. On the one hand, an em-
ployer can defeat such a charge by showing that the handicap impairs job
performance; on the other hand, if the employee then successfully proves that
his handicap has been overcome (with the aid of glasses, a prosthetic device, or
medication) so that his work is unimpaired, the court can find that he is not
handicapped, and therefore has no standing. Even viewed in the most
favorable light (conceivably a claimant could be substantially impaired in
some areas of life, but still manage to perform a job without impairment), the
Burgess rationale creates an extremely narrow class of protected persons,
widely missing the mark of construing a remedial statute "liberally, in a man-
ner which assures fulfillment of the beneficial goals for which it is enacted and
which brings within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope." 97
Widespread adoption of the federal definition of "handicapped individ-
ual"98 would be, of course, an aid to hitting that mark. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, courts must come to recognize that if employment is denied on the basis
of a condition that the employer regards as a handicap,99 and if this condition
does not impair job performance, then unlawful handicap employment dis-
crimination has occurred and the claimant must prevail. 10° Outlawing dis-
crimination against "perceived" handicaps advances two important concerns.
First, it protects the person against whom there is no rational basis for discrim-
ination. Second, it ultimately helps to dispel the prejudice that irrationally 0 1
96. See supra note 15.
97. Burgess, 298 N.C. at 524, 259 S.E.2d at 251 (citations omitted). See also supra text ac-
companying notes 76-78.
98. See supra text accompanying note 32. At present, only twelve states use a definition
comparable to the federal standard. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
99. If the employer expressly offers a physical, mental, or emotional condition as the reason
for job denial, he should not be allowed to argue disingenuously that he does not regard the
condition as a handicap. As the North Carolina Court of Appeals observed, Schlitz obviously
viewed Burgess as "being under some type of disability," Burgess, 39 N.C. App. at 486, 250 S.E.2d
at 690, when it refused him a job because he had glaucoma.
100. See supra note 15.
101. Alcoholism, for example, has traditionally been viewed as sinful behavior rather than as
a disease, so the alcoholic has been seen as wicked rather than sick. See generally Note, Alcohol
Abuse and the Law, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 1660 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Alcohol]. Obese
persons have been viewed as gluttons (gluttony is one of the seven deadly spiritual sins), but recent
research suggests that their condition may be involuntary. See generally Comment, The Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973: Protection for Victims of Weight Discrimination?, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 947
(1982). Mentally retarded persons were once thought to be demoniacal. S. DAVIES, THE MEN-
TALLY RETARDED IN SOCIETY 9-10 (1959). Epileptic persons have been classified, for purposes of
sterilization by the state, with "idiots, imbeciles and morons.. . rapists, certain criminals and
other defectives." Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 48, 88 A. 963, 964 (1913).
Even among educated people, prejudice against handicapped persons has at times reached an
absurd, almost hysterical, level:
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attaches to certain conditions. Conversely, if an employer is allowed to dis-
criminate against a person who merely is presumed to have a certain condi-
tion, or who once had such a condition, the prejudice against that condition
inevitably will be reinforced.
0 2
In addition to "perceived" handicaps, many states exclude from coverage
an emerging category of handicaps labeled "voluntary." A 1980 Louisiana
law, for example, essentially adopted the federal definition of handicap, but
made exceptions for "chronic alcoholism or any other form of active drug ad-
diction."'1 3 Similarly, California has enacted regulations excluding from pro-
tection those suffering from "alcoholism or narcotics addition."'1 4 The trend,
indeed, appears to be toward the exclusion of "voluntary" handicaps, with
obesity and drug and alcohol addictions commonly among the handicaps so
classified. l
05
Wisconsin, which has frequently championed the cause of equal employ-
ment opportunity for handicapped persons,1 6 labels venereal disease "volun-
tary" and therefore undeserving of statutory protection.'0 7 Furthermore,
without going as far as to declare alcoholism a voluntary handicap, the Wis-
Since time immemorial, the criminal and defective have been the "cancer of society."
Strong, intelligent, useful families are becoming smaller and smaller; while irresponsible,
diseased, defective families are becoming larger. The result can only be race degenera-
tion. To prevent this race suicide we must prevent the socially inadequate persons from
propagating their kind, i.e., the feebleminded, epileptic, insane, criminal, diseased, and
others.
Note, A Sterilization Statutefor Kentucky?, 23 Ky. L.J. 168, 168 (1934).
In a slightly more temperate vein, Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are mani-
festly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccina-
tion is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citations omitted). Today, it is becoming clear that the
assumptions about the criminal tendencies of handicapped persons and the beliefs about the he-
reditary nature of handicapping conditions were incorrect, and that attempts to eliminate such
conditions through sterilization were misguided. See Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded- A
Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 917, 924-27 (1974).
102. A person denied a job because he suffers from some condition that renders him de facto
unemployable has been labeled and stigmatized. Stigmatization can be compared to a "sentence
of death." Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Citizens (PARC) v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972). "The imposition of an unfortunate label reinforces a person's feelings of
insecurity and negative self-concepts, tends to cause behavior to conform to role expectations, and
results in a situation in which the individual shortchanges his or her own potential as a result of
being pigeonholed by others." LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 50-51. In turn, if people nega-
tively labeled view themselves in a negative light, it is to be expected that society will react in kind
by accepting and perpetuating these persons' self-images.
103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2251-2256 (West 1982).
104. 2 CAL. ADM. CODE, Div. 4 §§ 2251-2256.
105. See Hartstein, supra note 39, at E-5 & E-6.
106. See Hartstein, supra note 39, at E-6 ("Wisconsin. . . has been in the forefront of making
law in favor of the handicapped."). See Chicago, M., St. P. & P. RR. v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1974) (court
adopted broad interpretation of "handicapped"). See also Wisconsin Tel. Co., v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 68 Wis. 2d 345, 368, 228 N.W.2d 649, 661 (1975) (court
held fair employment statute designed to prevent discrimination causing poverty and other
suffering).
107. See Johnson v. Dutchand Dairy Foods, ERD Case No. 7735019, slip op., (Wis. Comm'n,
Oct. ll, 1979), cited in Hartstein, supra note 39, at E-6 n.15.
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consin Supreme Court recently refused to equate a "drinking problem" with
alcoholism, noting that the former might be voluntary even if the latter were
not.108 The court held that when an employee had been discharged because of
a "drinking problem" (which did not prevent satisfactory job performance),
the state's antidiscrimination statute had been violated only if the employee's
drinking was "non-volitional."' 1 9 The court said: "If his drinking was voli-
tional it hardly can be classified as a handicap within the meaning of our anti-
discrimination statute."' 10 Thus, "medically definable alcoholism" is techni-
cally a handicap; a mere "drinking problem" is not."' This analysis misses
the point and leads to a variation of the Burgess rationale. 1 2 The inquiry in
both cases should have been addressed first to whether the condition was per-
ceived or treated as a handicap, and second to whether it interfered with job
performance. Here, as in Burgess, it seems that the less serious the problem,
and the slighter the rational basis for discrimination, the more the courts are
prepared to tolerate discrimination.
The exclusion of "voluntary" handicaps from antidiscrimination coverage
could be devastating to the employment rights of handicapped persons. Ar-
guably, none of the recognized exclusions is truly voluntary. A person suffer-
ing from venereal disease may have voluntarily engaged in sexual relations,
but no more voluntarily contracted the disease than someone who drives an
automobile voluntarily sustains injury in a crash. Less obviously, it is becom-
ing increasingly well recognized that although obese persons, and those ad-
dicted to alcohol or drugs, do on occasion conquer their handicapping
conditions, they may be suffering from compulsions, or even diseases, that re-
quire professional intervention to overcome.' 13 It should not be presumed, in
other words, that these people have voluntarily assumed their handicaps, nor
that they could voluntarily banish them. Moreover, because the recognized
exclusions are logically analogous to the car-crash hypothetical, if the trend
toward excluding "voluntary" handicaps continues, coverage ultimately could
be denied any handicap deriving from some voluntary action on the part of
the affected persons, or carrying this logic to its extreme, perhaps only birth
defects could be considered truly involuntary.
The effort to exclude voluntary handicaps may stem from a desire to
avoid making handicap legislation a catch-all to cover every conceivable form
of discrimination not already forbidden by more specific legislation. It may
also derive from a sense that alcoholics, drug addicts, obese people, and per-
sons with "social diseases" are sinners1 14 and therefore do not deserve statu-
108. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations,
86 Wis. 2d 393, 273 N.W.2d 206 (1979).
109. Id at 408, 273 N.W.2d at 213.
110. Id
111. Id
112. See supra text accompanying notes 64-73.
113. See Comment, supra note 101, at 947 (obesity, properly understood, may be voluntary);
Note, Alcohol, supra note 101, at 1661-62 (alcoholism now widely regarded as disease).
114. See supra note 101. A Pennsylvania court has held that a "morbidly obese" person is
handicapped, but took no position concerning those who are merely "obese." English v. Philadel-
NORTH CAROLINA L,4W REVIEW[
tory protection. Nonetheless, it is intellectually dishonest to pretend either
that these persons are not handicapped or that they have willfully handi-
capped themselves. Moreover, because antidiscrimination employment stat-
utes are designed both to dispel prejudice and enhance productivity," 5 a
strong argument can be made for protecting these persons. Assuming, how-
ever, that states are unwilling to do so, certain handicaps can be excluded from
coverage without resort to the label "voluntary." Legislatures simply could
admit that they are making value judgments and policy decisions that they feel
no compulsion to rationalize. Alternatively, courts could examine so-called
"voluntary" handicaps in the context of accommodation' 16 by holding that it
is unreasonable to require employers to make allowances for an employee who
is, for instance, drunk on the job.'
17
Indeed, if the concern is that it is difficult to weigh the policy that people
must bear the consequences of their actions against society's need to employ as
many people as possible, then the creation of specific "voluntary" handicaps
does little to resolve the problem. It seems clear that epilepsy, for example,
should be considered a handicap; 1 8 it is not clear that a person who refuses to
take medication to control his epilepsy should be protected. If the employee
could but will not control the disease, then perhaps in that limited instance
epilepsy should be considered a "voluntary" handicap. This possibility does
not justify, however, excluding all persons with epilepsy from coverage. More
useful than an analysis that denies protection to "voluntary" handicaps is one
which proceeds along previously suggested lines.' 19 First, is the condition the
basis for job denial? And second, does the condition impair job performance?
If the answer to both questions is "yes," and the law does not require the
employer to accommodate the employee's handicap, 20 then the employer has
won his case. 121 If the law does require accommodation, the next question is
whether it is reasonable to require an employer to accommodate an employee
who refuses to take medication. In most instances, the answer to this question
would be "no," and the employer would win at that stage. 122 Although label-
ing some handicaps "voluntary" results in clearly defined rules, easy to apply
phia Elec. Co., No. 12163, slip op., (Pa. Comm'n, 1980), citedin Hartstein, supra note 39, at E-5
n.2. Cf Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. v. Wisconson Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 86
Wis. 2d 393, 273 N.W.2d 206 (1979) (medically definable alcoholism a handicap, mere drinking
problem is not). Even states that recognize the involuntary nature of certain handicaps continue
to make distinctions based on the severity of the condition, which would seem to reflect a judg-
ment that only radically overweight or alcoholic persons are truly out of control.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 81 & 101-02.
116. For a discussion of what accommodation means and entails, see infra text accompanying
notes 133-40.
117. See Squires v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 97 Wis. 2d 648, 294 N.W.2d 48 (1980)
(alcoholic handicapped but could be discharged because drinking impaired job performance),
118. See, e.g., Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas, 22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461 (1979)
(court assumed, without discussion, that epilepsy is handicap).
119. See diagram, supra note 15.
120. Most states do appear to require accommodation, whether by statute, administrative reg-
ulation, or case law. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
121. See diagram, supra note 15.
122. See diagram, supra note 15.
[Vol. 62
HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
and enforce, such rules are unsuited to antidiscrimination legislation, which is
remedial123 and addresses subtle, frequently irrational,12 4 forms of prejudice.
Strict categorical exclusion is particularly unsuited to handicap antidis-
crimination legislation because handicaps, unlike race or sex, are so varied in
type and degree.'2 5 Thus, if the purpose of such legislation is to be fulfilled,
flexibility is essential.
II. THE ACCOMMODATION ISSUE
Although much litigation has centered on the question whether the claim-
ant can be considered legally handicapped, that issue is primarily an employ-
ers' stratagem representing resistance to the idea that the state may interfere
with their hiring decisions. As in Burgess,126 Barnes,'27 and Dairy Equp-
ment, 12s an employer who concedes he has denied employment because he
considers an applicant handicapped nonetheless may seek to avoid trial on the
merits by contending that the person is in fact not handicapped. By contrast,
accommodation is the truly difficult issue facing even those who wholeheart-
edly support equal employment opportunity for handicapped persons. A re-
quirement of reasonable accommodation is, in practical effect, unique to the
field of handicap law. 129 Because affirmative action is controversial in any
context,' 30 accommodation can be expected to generate heated dispute, partic-
ularly in employment cases. It is quite compelling to argue that handicapped
persons must be given special treatment with regard to, for example, public
education or access to public transportation, on the ground that these are inci-
dents of full citizenship which the government should make available to all.
Employers, however, especially in the private sector, are justifiably concerned
123. See Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 524, 259 S.E.2d 248,251 (1979).
124. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
125. Epilepsy, for example, may produce different types of seizures, classified as "grand mal,"
"petit mal," "psychomotor," and "Jacksonian," resulting in different degrees of disability. See
LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 36-37. Mental retardation, similarly, may be "mild," "moderate,"
"severe," or "profound," and result in markedly different levels of adaptive behavior. Id at 38-
40.
126. Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
127. Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas, 22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461 (1979).
128. Wisconsin Dairy Equip. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 95
Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980).
129. Title VII requires reasonable accommodation in cases of religious discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). This requirement, however, has been construed very narrowly. See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (employer not required to sacrifice
efficiency, make expenditures more than de minimus in aggregate, discriminate against other em-
ployees or violate collective bargaining agreement to accommodate employee's religious belief).
130. In the context of racial discrimination, the constitutionality of affirmative action plans
has been seriously challenged. When segregation has been deliberate, however, the Supreme
Court has held that federal district courts may fashion affirmative action remedies. See Swam v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1972). Five justices have held that past discrimi-
nation and an interest in academic diversity permit a state university to take race or ethnicity into
account in admissions programs. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The
Court has also held that private affirmative action employment programs do not violate federal
law. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Nonetheless, whether state action
that gives preference to racial minorities in order to remedy past "societal discrimination" is con-
stitutional is an open question. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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with efficiency, safety, and maximizing profits. In a free enterprise system,
their reluctance to modify job requirements or invest capital to accommodate
a handicapped person must be given some deference.
Some states have no accommodation requirement, 131 but most, following
the federal lead, 132 appear to require "reasonable accommodation" of handi-
capped persons unless "undue hardship" to the employer would result.' 33 Al-
though the accommodation issue is an obvious battleground, to date it has
been the site only of inconclusive skirmishes.' 34 Indeed, even in jurisdictions
requiring reasonable accommodation, analytic models are emerging that pre-
clude consideration of the issue.'
35
Were the issue squarely faced, it would enter a handicap employment
discrimination case at the third stage of analysis. First, it must be established
that the plaintiff has been denied employment on the basis of a handicap. 136
Second, the employer must prove that the handicap impairs job perform-
ance137 by showing that the handicapped person is unable to perform the job,
or to do so safely, or to do so unless job requirements are modified. Third, the
claim would reach the crucial, and complicated, issue of accommodation. Be-
cause standards of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" to the
employer are obviously subjective and elastic, it is essential to examine the
variables likely to be involved in order to formulate a step-by-step analysis
leading to equitable application.
Accommodation can take many forms, including "improved accessibility,
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition and modi-
fication of equipment, the provision of readers or interpreters and other simi-
lar actions."138 Whether such accommodation is in turn "reasonable" and
poses no "undue hardship" will depend on a variety of factors, such as "the
131. North Carolina's handicap employment discrimination statute, for instance, does not
mention accommodation. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982). Because the state has no enforce-
ment agency, the accommodation requirement has not been imposed through administrative re~u-
lations. Moreover, because no case arising under the statute has reached judgment on the merits,
North Carolina's courts have had no opportunity to inquire whether an accommodation require-
ment should be imposed through case law.
132. Although the accommodation requirement does not appear in § 503 or § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), the duty to accommodate is
imposed by administrative regulation. See supra note 33.
133. Some states, such as Washington and Pennsylvania, have not attempted to set standards
applying the accommodation requirement, and merely state the duty to accommodate in general
terms. Regulations in California, Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, and Ohio give examples of reason-
able accommodation and establish standards for hardship.
In Montana, the state's Human Rights Commission found an implied duty of reasonable
accommodation. See Hartstein, supra note 39, at E-6 & E-7.
134. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (Court failed to
reach accommodation issue in handicap discrimination case, but intimated accommodations re-
quested would be unreasonable or unduly burdensome).
135. See supra note 15 (accommodation issue can be avoided by focusing on question of
standing).
136. See supra note 15. This is established if the employer admits that he has refused employ-
ment because of the applicant's physical or mental condition. The focus is on the reason for job
denial, not on whether the employee is legally handicapped.
137. See supra note 15.
138. See Harstein, supra note 39, at E-6.
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nature and cost of accommodation needed, the size and nature of the business,
the number and type of facilities, and the structure and composition of the
work force."' 139 Only rarely is a person truly incapable of performing a job if
accommodation possibilities are considered seriously. For instance, if a per-
son is incapable of operating a piece of machinery because of a physical hand-
icap, an imaginative redesign of that machine might overcome the
difficulty.14° Perhaps the employer could assert successfully that such an ac-
commodation would be unreasonable or unduly burdensome. Replies of that
sort, however, should be evaluated after the kind of accommodation contem-
plated has been identified.'
4 1
Most objections to accommodation probably would fall into one of two
categories. The employer would assert that the person could under no circum-
stances perform safely, which seems to go to the "reasonableness" defense; or
he would maintain that accommodation would be prohibitively expensive,
which goes to the "undue hardship" defense.142 Safety could be the sole con-
sideration, but it would frequently be tied directly to considerations of expense
(e.g., a handicapped person's ability to perform safely could be overcome only
by providing extensively modified equipment or elaborate supervision). Occa-
sionally, an extremely expensive accommodation, such as hiring a second per-
son solely to provide the handicapped person with continuous supervision,
could both eliminate safety hazards and impose no undue hardship on the
employer because of his extensive resources; such accommodation nonetheless
appears unreasonable from a common-sense point of view. Thus, a number of
variables affect a determination whether accommodation is unreasonable or
unduly burdensome. Unfortunately, the reported cases indicate that although
these variables do indeed affect the outcome of handicap employment discrim-
ination claims, they rarely are analyzed in terms of accommodation, and tend
instead to sway courts' judgments before the issue is reached."43
The Supreme Court case of Southeastern Community College v. Davis'"
illustrates the way in which safety and expense considerations can be determi-
139. Id
140. A "grand mal" epileptic seizure, for example, could cause a worker to fall into dangerous
machinery. McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEx. L. REv. 999,
1008 n.35 (1981). Nonetheless, "[r]elatively inexpensive protective devices ... can substantially
reduce" that risk. Id. at 1066.
141. See supra note 15 (consideration of accommodation possibilities precedes determination
whether accommodation unreasonable or unduly burdensome).
142. Because the courts so rarely compel accommodation in the workplace, see McGarity &
Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1065, it is difficult to tell whether there is a real distinction between
an accommodation that is unreasonable and one that is unduly burdensome. In Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), the Supreme Court suggested that it would be
unreasonable to require a nursing school to modify its training program to accommodate a hear-
ing-impaired student, because safety hazards would persist. Id. at 411-13. It has been suggested,
however, that efficiency considerations were the real concern. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note
140, at 1042 ("it undoubtedly would cost more to tailor [the nursing-school program to plaintiffs]
special needs"). Possibly, then, the Supreme Court felt that accommodating plaintiff would prove
unduly burdensome.
143. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 144-66.
144. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
native at a preliminary stage of analysis, rather than at the accommodation
stage where they properly belong. The case involved education, not employ-
ment, but is highly analogous: a severely hearing-impaired nursing-school ap-
plicant was denied admission although she had the required academic
credentials.' 4 - Her claim under section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act' 46 failed because the Court agreed with the defendant school that the wo-
man's handicap would prevent her from safely completing her clinical training
and then safely serving the public.147
Section 504 extends protection to persons who are handicapped but
"otherwise qualified"; 148 the Court reasoned that because of her handicap,
plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified."' 149 By deciding that "otherwise quali-
fied" meant "qualified in spite of the handicap,"'150 the Court terminated its
analysis before reaching the accommodation issue, much as the Burgess court
avoided the merits by deciding that plaintiff was not legally handicapped.'15
The Court also avoided a straightforward analysis of accommodation.152 Had
the issue been directly addressed, the outcome ultimately might have been the
same, but at least the unique nature of handicap antidiscrimination legislation
would have been emphasized.
For example, the Court could have held that plaintiff was indeed "other-
wise qualified," because her credentials were in order, but because her handi-
cap would pose a safety hazard, she had not been denied admission "solely"
on the basis of her handicap.' 5 3 The Court then would have been forced to
examine the legitimacy of the school's "safety" defense; the opinion indicates
that providing an interpreter and putting restrictions on plaintiffs license to
practice probably could have eliminated safety hazards.' 5 4 Thus, the next
question would have been whether such accommodation was unreasonable or
unduly burdensome.155 Without squarely deciding what the law required and
what accommodation could accomplish,' 5 6 the Court indicated that the modi-
fications in the nursing program requested by plaintiff were indeed unreasona-
ble, because they would have caused the school to lower its standards and
compromise the integrity of its training program.' 5 7 This finding, however,
145. Id at 400-02.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (recipients of federal financial assistance may not discriminate
"solely" on the basis of handicap against "otherwise qualified... individuals").
147. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 401-09.
148. See supra note 146.
149. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 405-14.
150. See id at 406-07.
151. See Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979); see also
supra text accompanying notes 64-97.
152. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 407-14 (noting § 504 did not mention affirmative action, Court did
not decide whether such requirement could ever be imposed by regulation, and did not inquire in
any detail whether proposed accommodation would overcome safety hazards).
153. See supra note 146.
154. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 407-09.
155. See supra note 15.
156. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-13 (Court conceded that refusal to accommodate might be
unlawful in some circumstances).
157. See id. at 413.
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ignored the nature of accommodation, which merely requires an employer to
tailor a job to fit a given individual's handicap. Asking the school to accom-
modate plaintiff would have created an exception in only this isolated case and
would have affected permanently neither the school's program nor its stan-
dards for nonhandicapped students.
In the Davis analysis, the Court may have been influenced by its previous
decision pertaining to religious employment discrimination.15 8 The Civil
Rights Act of 1964159 requires employers to make reasonable accommodation
to employees' religious beliefs. The Court, however, has effectively interpreted
this requirement out of the statute160 because it was faced with a dilemma: a
constitutional challenge to the provision, on the ground that it violates the first
amendment's establishment of religion clause, could well be sustained.' 61 As
Justice Marshall has suggested, the Court may have chosen to interpret the
provision restrictively rather than declare it unconstitutional. 162 In the area of
handicap law, however, the Court would not be forced to employ strict scru-
tiny.163 There is no express provision in the Constitution regarding handicap;
employment has never been held to be a fundamental right, 164 nor is handicap
a suspect classification. 165 To uphold accommodation of handicapped work-
ers, the Court would have to find only a rational basis for giving them special
treatment. 166 Viewed in this light, it becomes clear that the ultimate question
in Davis should have been whether the expense involved in accommodating
plaintiff was unduly burdensome. The answer would depend on the school's
resources and on factors such as whether plaintiff was able to provide her own
interpreter. Under the Court's analysis, however, the accommodation issue
was never addressed squarely and the sub-issue of expense never emerged at
all.
158. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976).
160. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (accommodation provi-
sion narrowly construed); see also supra note 129.
161. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 89-91 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Strict constitutional analysis is invoked when state action is predicated on a "suspect"
classification, such as race, or impinges on a "fundamental right," such as the right to marry. See
supra note 29.
164. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (per curiam)
(age not a suspect classification); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16
(1973) (education not fundamental right); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (poverty
not a suspect classification).
165. See, e.g., Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (no strict scrutiny for exclu-
sion of blind applicants). Cf. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (exclusion of
handicapped persons unconstitutional under "irrebuttable presumption" due process analysis),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
166. Moreover, even when a classification, such as race, is suspect, it may be constitutionally
valid if "an important and articulated purpose" is shown. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dis-
sentin& in part). But see Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (exclusion of applicant
with high blood pressure from postal service job upheld; court, in dictum, adhered to rationale of
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 412 U.S. 63 (1979), without citing case, although no con-
stitutional issue presented).
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The Davis analysis probably will distort future attempts to treat handicap
discrimination claims. 167 The opinion gives an easy legitimacy to the bona
fide occupational qualification (bfoq) defense,'16 in which an employer asserts
that "specific physical and mental qualifications are absolutely needed"'
69 to
perform a job. It is all too easy, after Davis, to assert this defense whenever a
handicapped person seeks employment. 170 If the defense should succeed, it
should do so only after accommodation is considered.
When, as in Davis, expense is the only genuine obstacle to giving a handi-
capped plaintiff relief, the analysis is fairly simple; an accommodation that is
too expensive is "unduly burdensome" and ipso facto not "reasonable."' 17
Whether an employer can assert successfully expense as a defense should de-
pend on two highly variable factors: the employer's own resources, and the
availability of government offsets such as tax incentives.'
72
An employer's cash outlay for accommodation may well pay for itself in
the long run because handicapped persons tend to remain in jobs longer, with
less absenteeism, than nonhandicapped workers. 173 Moreover, even if a cash
outlay represents a genuine loss, it easily could be absorbed by an employer
with substantial resources. Nor would a wealthy employer be forced to make
repeated accommodations for a never-ending line of handicapped job appli-
cants until his entire plant was staffed by disabled persons; again, unlike reli-
gious employment discrimination, which invokes strict-scrutiny constitutional
analysis, linedrawing can be achieved on a merely rational basis. Thus, a
formula could be devised to determine what is unduly burdensome in terms of
the employer's resources at any given time; however, to date, the effort has not
been made.
Government offsets also bear on whether accommodation is unduly bur-
densome. They should bear in addition on whether accommodation is reason-
able because, by encouraging the employment of handicapped persons, society
escapes responsibility foi disability payments and reaps the benefit of added
167. Although Davis is an education case, it bears on employment because plaintiff was seek-
ingjob training and the clinical phase of the training entailed working directly with patients. See
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979).
168. The bfoq defense is recognized under Title VII in cases involving discrimination based
on sex, religion and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976). It has been construed nar-
rowly, however. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell, 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (employer has
burden of proving bfoq by showing he had reasonable cause, factual basis, for believing all or
substantially all of protected class would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the job in-
volved). The bfoq defense is not recognized under Title VII racial discrimination cases. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1976) (race not mentioned in bfoq provision). Cf. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623(0(2) (1976 & Supp. I 1978) (bfoq an
affirmative defense); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 1974) (em-
ployer must have rational basis in fact for believing older workers would increase risk of harm),
169. Burstein & Foster, Handicap Discrimination: The Available Defenses, 7 EMPL. REL. L.J,
672, 678 (1982).
170. But see Puskin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981) (court held
severely handicapped doctor was "otherwise qualified" because he had proper credentials).
171. This may have been the unstated rationale for the Davis decision. See supra note 142.
172. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
173. Erf, supra note 27, at 818.
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productivity. 174 It is, therefore, arguably unreasonable to shift to employers
the entire burden of making extra productivity possible. The experience of the
Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago illustrates the point. By placing 176 physi-
cally disabled adults in diverse employment positions, the Institute discovered
that in a single year $1,056,000 in disability payments had been eliminated,
while society had gained $1,643,000 in productivity. 175 Government can de-
fray the cost of accommodation by providing tax credits and deductions for
barrier removal, special equipment in the work place and even added supervi-
sory personnel. 176 Increased government involvement in accommodation ef-
forts should help achieve two goals. First, employers' resentment toward
statutory mandates is likely to diminish if they believe they will be rewarded
economically for hiring handicapped workers. Second, more handicapped
persons can be employed.
On occasion, an employer may mask his belief that hiring a handicapped
person will prove expensive by asserting that he is really concerned for the job
applicant's safety. "The courts are usually skeptical of an employer's argu-
ment that it refuses to hire qualified applicants for their own good, and they
often require a higher level ofjustification in these cases than in cases in which
public safety is at stake."' 177 In Wisconsin Dairy Equoment Co. v. Wisconsin
Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations178 an employee with only
one kidney was dismissed from a truck-assembler's job when his condition
became known.179 The employer argued that the employee might fall from a
truck tank and damage the remaining kidney.180 Observing that plaintiff "was
not more likely to fall because he had only one kidney,"' 81 the court held that
it was the employer's burden to establish to a "reasonable probability"' 82 that
the employee was unable to work safely and concluded that the burden had
not been met.
18 3
174. See supra text accompanying note 81.
175. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, SPECIAL REPORT:
DISABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT, FACTS ABouT COSTS AND BENEFITS 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL REPORT].
176. The federal government has in the past offered tax deductions of up to $25,000 per year
for "architectural and transportation barrier removal expenses" incurred to make facilities more
accessible to handicapped persons. See 26 U.S.C. § 190 (1978 & Supp. V 1983). This provision
expired, however, on Dec. 31, 1982, and has not been renewed. Several bills are pending, some of
which would merely re-create § 190, and one of which would increase the deductible amount to
$100,000 and extend the provision's life beyond the previous two-year span.
North Carolina offers unlimited tax deductions for access renovations to existing buildings.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.5(b)(10) (Supp. 1981). Nonetheless, a bill that would have pro-
vided an income tax credit for adaptive devices and equipment for handicapped persons failed in
1983. N.C.S. 435. The Senate Finance Committee reported favorably on a committee substitute
that called for the Legislative Research Commission to study this idea. The committee substitute
was referred to the appropriations committee, and apparently no such study was authorized by the
General Assembly.
177. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1049.
178. 95 Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980).
179. Id at 321, 290 N.W.2d at 331.
180. Id at 322, 290 N.W.2d at 332.
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While the outcome seems correct, the court failed to consider that ex-
pense, rather than safety, was the employer's real concern. A more careful
analysis would have addressed the employer's fear of excessive workers' com-
pensation payments should the employee damage his remaining kidney,
t8 4
and the employer's assertion that the job contained "inherent dangers" be-
cause of the "height at which a truck assembler must work."' 185 The court
brushed these concerns aside, when in fact both the operation of a state's
workers' compensation statute and the inherent risk of a given job do come
into play when an employer decides whether to hire a handicapped person. It
follows that they should enter into an analysis of handicap employment dis-
crimination cases as well.
Nearly all states' workers' compensation statutes provide second-injury
funds' 86 designed to "reduce the disincentive to employ the disabled"' 187 by
relieving the employer of liability for preexisting disabilities.188 "The provi-
sions generally have the effect of imposing liability on the employer or his
insurer only for the degree of disability resulting from the injury arising out of
employment with his company."'189 Moreover, "[s]tudies show that the acci-
dent experience of properly placed disabled workers is at least equal, if not
superior, to that of non-disabled workers,"' 90 and that "there is only a small
probability that a subsequent injury will interact with a pre-existing condition
to produce a permanent total disability."' 19 Second-injury statutes have not,
however, "completely eliminated the incentive for employers to screen out
handicapped job applicants."'192 First, many employers are either altogether
unaware of second-injury provisions or do not understand how they work. 1
93
Second, access to the fund may be limited to preclude coverage for a number
of preexisting conditions, 194 or coverage may be conditioned on notice to the
state by the employer that he has hired a disabled worker. 195 Third, the prin-
cipal methods of financing the second-injury fund may discourage employers
from hiring handicapped persons.
196
184. See id at 322, 290 N.W.2d at 332. See also infra note 201.
185. Dairy Equopment, 95 Wis. 2d at 322, 290 N.W.2d at 332.
186. See generally 2 A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 59.31 (1983).
See also 2 A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DESK EDITION § 50.30, at 1050
n.17 (Cum. Supp. Apr. 1981) (Georgia only state without second-injury fund).
187. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1012.
188. Erf, supra note 27, at 822.
189. Id
190. Id at 821.
191. Id
192. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1013.
193. See Erf, supra note 27, at 820-25.
194. In about half the states, asthma, epilepsy, or a coronary ailment, for example, will not
allow resort to the second-injury fund if the initial disability must be an "injury." See id at 823.
195. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 175, at 4.
196. Ordinarily, if an employee dies in a work-related accident or suffers some specified in-
jury, such as loss of a hand or eye, the employer either contributes a fixed sum or is assessed a
percentage of his total compensation payments over a set period. A third method of financing the
second-injury fund is through the general tax revenues of the state. This approach is more condu-
cive to the hiring of handicapped workers because the employer shoulders no additional burden in
order to maintain the fund. It has been suggested, however, that this should not be the exclusive
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Although the operation of a second-injury fund may be an extremely im-
portant factor in an employer's decision whether to hire a handicapped person,
courts quite rightly do not give the fund much weight in analyzing discrimina-
tion claims. First, the possibility of a second injury, or one which exacerbates
an underlying disease, is highly speculative, 197 and courts have been reluctant
to "allow an employer to deny employment opportunities to those who may
have problems in the future."' 9 8 Second, courts are not in a position to reform
workers' compensation-that is a job for the legislature. Courts can, however,
bring the need for such reform to lawmakers' attention. Workers' compensa-
tion laws predate handicap employment discrimination statutes by many
years, 199 and the potential interaction between the two types of statutes proba-
bly has not occurred to most legislators. If courts would make it clear that
hiring and accommodating handicapped workers appears more reasonable
and less burdensome in states with progressive second-injury fund provisions,
perhaps the oversight could be remedied.
The court in Dairy Equ#7ment made no reference to Wisconsin's second-
injury provision.20° It was actually highly relevant and would have served to
refute the employer's argument that a second injury would have resulted in
burdensome workers' compensation payments. 201 First, access to the fund
was allowed not only for an earlier injury but also for any "permanent disabil-
ity"'20 2 which, if it had resulted from the second injury, would have entitled the
employee to certain scheduled disability payments.203 The employee in Dairy
Equpment, in other words, would have been covered by the second-injury
provision. Second, the fund was financed by employer contributions required
whenever an employee suffered "the loss or . . .the total impairment of a
method of financing a second-injury fund because employers do reap economic benefits from
hiring handicapped workers and therefore should be required to bear some of the cost. See Er,
supra note 27, at 824-25 nn.57-60.
197. See id at 821 (probability small of second injury interacting with preexisting condition to
cause permanent total disability, and accident experience of disabled workers as good as that of
the nonhandicapped).
198. Burstein & Foster, supra note 169, at 677.
199. North Carolina's second-injury fund provision, for example, was enacted in 1953, 20
years before its handicap employment discrimination statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT § 97-40.1
(1979); id § 168-6 (1982).
200. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.59 (West 1973).
201. The employer "admitted that it was concerned with the costs to the company of care and
treatment of the respondent, if injured, under its workmen's compensation policy," and contended
that "it was too great a risk both from the humanistic standpoint of permanently injuring the man
and from a cost standpoint to the company," to keep the man on the job. Dairy Equpment, 95
Wis. 2d at 322, 290 N.W.2d at 332.
202. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.59(1) (West 1973).
203. If an employee has at the time of injury permanent disability which if it had resulted
from such injury would have entitled him to indemnity for 200 weeks less 2 % thereof
for each year of age above 50 years with no reduction in excess of 50%, he shall be paid
from the funds provided in this section additional compensation equivalent to the
amount which would be payable for said previous disability if it had resulted from such
injury or the amount which is payable for said further disability, whichever is the lesser.
If said disabilities result in permanent total disability the additional compensation shall
be in such amount as will complete the payments which would have been due had said
permanent total disability resulted from such injury.
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hand, arm, foot, leg or eye.''2°4 Hence, the Dairy Equipment employer would
have been forced to contribute to the fund if an employee, for example, had
lost an eye in a fall, but he would have contributed nothing if the employee
injured his remaining kidney. An eye injury, therefore, could have cost the
employer more than the anticipated kidney injury.
The Dairy Equipment employer also argued that a truck-assembler's job
was inherently dangerous. 20 5 The court gave this argument short shrift, point-
ing out that "[t]he record fail[ed] to disclose any evidence" that an employee
previously had been injured performing the job plaintiff was seeking.20 6 This
observation is relevant because workers' compensation insurance premiums
are based in part on "the employer's actual accident experience. '20 7 Nonethe-
less, premiums also are based on "the relative hazard of the employer's indus-
try."208 Thus, if the job was inherently dangerous, the employer would pay
higher premiums regardless of whether he hired a disabled worker. Moreover,
if a job is equally dangerous to handicapped and nonhandicapped workers,209
then the issue is not whether a handicapped worker must be accommodated
210
but whether the workplace is sufficiently safe.21' When the workplace is inher-
ently unsafe, an employer should not be permitted to use his reluctance to
improve safety standards to discriminate against handicapped workers.
Safety questions become more complex, however, when an employer al-
leges that the general public, or an applicant's co-workers, will be endangered
by the applicant's handicapping condition. As Southeastern Community Co-
204. Id. at § 102.59(2).
205. Truck assemblers had to climb to a height of ten or twelve feet, and "'pipe-like' objects
protrud[ed] from the steel tanks." Dairy Equpmen, 95 Wis. 2d at 322, 290 N.W.2d at 332.
Should a worker fall, in other words, some part of his body could strike one of these protruding
objects with considerable force, and he could be severely injured. The employer did not, however,
point out that were a worker to fall he could injure his head, for instance, as easily as his kidneys.
206. Id. at 333, 290 N.W.2d at 337.
207. Ert, supra note 27, at 820.
208. Id
209. The court observed that a person with only one kidney is no more likely to fall from
heights than any other person. Dairy Equipment, 95 Wis. 2d at 333, 290 N.W.2d at 337.
210. Conceivably, the danger of a fall could have been eliminated through the use of a safety
harness, such as those worn by telephone linemen. Apparently the company considered using
harnesses but "found that idea to be impractical." Id at 322 n.1, 290 N.W.2d at 331 n.l.
211. If all employees are endangered by working conditions, the issue is resolved properly, not
by resort to handicap employment discrimination statutes, but to the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which imposes on
employers a duty to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees." Id. at § 654(a)(1). The express purpose and intent of OSHA is to
assure "so far as possible" that all working men and women have "safe and healthful working
conditions." Id. at § 651(b). Moreover, whereas burdensome expense provides a defense to the
duty to accomodate handicapped employees, under OSHA the workers' health and safety are
paramount. In promulgating OSHA rules, for instance, the Secretary of Labor is obligated to
consider only the feasibility of safety modifications. He is not required to make a cost-benefit
analysis. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). Penalties under
OSHA may be harsh. For example, the Secretary of Labor can petition the district courts to
require complete cessation of operations while safety modifications are made. 29 U.S.C. § 662(a)
(1976). OSHA violations may result in fines of up to $20,000 and imprisonment of up to one year.
Id. § 666(e). Thus, an employer should hesitate to defend against a handicap employment dis-
crimination claim by asserting that his workplace is inherently dangerous.
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lege v. Davis212 suggests, courts are particularly likely to defer to the safety
defense when the safety of others, rather than that of only the employee, is
involved.213 Indeed, when others' safety allegedly is threatened, courts tend to
demand merely a lax "rational basis" standard of proof.214 When only the
safety of the employee is at issue, however, courts generally require the more
rigorous standard suggested by the sex discrimination case of Weeks v. South-
ern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. :215 the employer must have a "factual
basis for believing that all or substantially all [of the excluded class] would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." 21
6
Total deference to the safety-of-others defense is unwarranted; an em-
ployer may as easily and as disingenuously allege concern for the safety of
others as for the handicapped employee. "When the applicant's own safety is
threatened, self-interest will eliminate many frivolous cases," 217 but one can-
not assume that if a handicapped person suspects he may pose a risk to the
safety of others he will refrain from bringing suit. Because "Ulob applicants
generally should not be allowed to set their autonomy interests above the
safety interests of innocent third parties,"218 a court suspecting that the em-
ployer's safety-of-others defense is not proffered entirely in good faith is none-
theless bound by conscience to examine carefully any claim that other people
will be endangered. Therefore, if the employee's own safety is at issue, doubts
about whether accommodation can eliminate safety hazards should be re-
solved in favor of the employee; when the safety of others is at stake, doubt
should be resolved in favor of the employer.
In many cases, employers attempt to avoid altogether an individualized
determination that it would be unsafe to hire a particular handicapped job
applicant. Citing safety, employers may devise screening methods to deny
jobs to all persons with real or perceived disabilities.219 Whether the policy is
formal or informal, 220 it may be extremely difficult to evaluate. The employer
may claim that all persons with epilepsy, for example, endanger themselves or
others in certain occupations, and therefore must be refused employment.
221
Although this assertion might be disproved by placing a given epileptic on the
212. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
213. Id. (hearing-impaired nursing-school applicant denied admission because of perceived
risk to patients). See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
214. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (exclusion of all metha-
done users rational even if overbroad); McCrea v. Cunningham, 202 Neb. 638, 277 N.W.2d 52
(1979) (rational to set visual-acuity standards for firefighters); Boynton Cab Co. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 96 Wis. 2d 396, 291 N.W.2d 850 (1980) (rational to
exclude all one-handed drivers from taxicab jobs).
215. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
216. Id. at 235. See McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1050.
217. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1068 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 1061.
219. See generally id
220. See id. at 1004 (may be formal methods of administering risk-oriented screens); Wiscon-
sin Dairy Equip. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 95 Wis. 2d 319,
321-22, 290 N.W.2d 330, 331-32 (1980) (employer had no formal policy, but denied employment
based on perceived risk).
221. "The most common handicap screens are those used to bar epileptics, diabetics, and per-
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job, the possibility remains that an on-the-job tryout could result in injury. A
court-ordered invalidation of an employment screen, in other words, may in-
volve genuine risk. In these as in other handicap employment discrimination
cases, however, the feasibility of accommodation should be considered before
the validity of a screen is upheld. At present, though, courts too readily reason
from the general to the particular in deciding that because some persons with a
given disability might create a safety hazard, so would the individual job
applicant.
222
In Boynton Cab Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations223 a man who had lost one hand was refused employment as
a cab driver 224 although he had a good safety record in the occupation 225 and
provided his own vehicle safety-modification equipment.226 Under the Wis-
consin Fair Employment Practices Statute, an employee must be "physically
or otherwise [able] to efficiently perform, at the standards set by the employer,
the duties required in that job.''227 The standards the employer set were those
used for Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and Wisconsin school-bus
regulations.2
28
In determining that no unlawful discrimination had occurred, the court
reasoned that because of "the high degree of care required of common carri-
ers," 229 the cab company had to show only that its exclusion of one-handed
drivers was "rational and reasonably tailored to advance safety considera-
tions. ' 230 It would be incorrect, the court concluded, to impose on the em-
ployer "the rigorous 'reasonable probability' burden of proof,"'23 1 established
by state precedent,232 that the specific individual could not perform safely the
job. The court failed completely to consider the possibility of accommodation
and ignored evidence that plaintiff had accommodated his own handicap by
providing special safety equipment. Further inquiry might have shown that
this accommodation surmounted safety hazards. Instead of exploring the ac-
commodation issue, however, the court focused on three arguably irrelevant
factors.
First, the court accepted the argument that federal motor-carrier and
school-bus regulations could be imposed appropriately on the taxicab indus-
try, but failed to consider that although large, heavy vehicles such as tractor-
sons with cardiovascular diseases from jobs in which constant vigilance is required to prevent
accidents." McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1008.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 223-35.
223. 96 Wis. 2d 396, 291 N.W.2d 850 (1980).
224. Id. at 398, 291 N.W.2d at 851.
225. See id. at 400, 291 N.W.2d at 852.
226. Id. at 399, 291 N.W.2d at 852.
227. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11 1.32(5)(f) (West 1974), repealed andre-created by Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.34 (West Supp. 1983-84).
228. Boynton Cab, 96 Wis. 2d at 402, 291 N.W.2d at 853.
229. Id at 419, 291 N.W.2d at 861.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. See id. at 420, 291 N.W.2d at 861 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (majority opinion
inconsistent with case law precedent).
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trailers and buses might be unsuited to modifications accommodating a one-
handed driver, modification of a taxicab might be entirely feasible. Second,
the court appeared to give great weight to the opinion of a Milwaukee judge
who testified that "if a personal injury action came before him involving a
one-handed taxicab driver, he would instruct the jury that, as a matter of law,
the cab company by hiring such driver had not exercised the requisite high
degree of care imposed on a common carrier."233 The court neglected to con-
sider that the judge's thoughts on the matter failed to rise to even the level of
dictum. Third, the court credited testimony from the cab company's vice pres-
ident that some other one-handed driver had been "involved in two accidents
which could have been avoided had the driver not been handicapped."
2 34
Based on these three highly equivocal pieces of evidence, the court concluded
that all one-handed drivers should be considered a uniform class, possessing
the characteristics of the least rather than the most capable members.235
Neither the official vehicle regulations, the judge's view, nor the company offi-
cial's testimony necessarily was related to the plaintiff's ability to drive a cab
safely, yet they tipped the balance against him.
InMcCrea v. CunninghaM236 a Nebraska court more nearly approached a
reasonable evaluation of a safety screen, but still fell short of the ideal. De-
fendant City of Omaha rejected by regulation all applicants for the job of
firefighter whose vision was less than 20/30, correctable to 20/20.237 The
court found the visual-acuity standard permissible because it "was directly re-
lated to the health and safety of firemen and the public. ' 238 Furthermore, the
court was unimpressed by arguments that the plaintiffs vision could "possibly
be corrected by the wearing of glasses for ordinary purposes. '23
9
Unlike the court in Boynton Cab, this court attempted to evaluate the
defendant's safety screen. The court examined evidence that numerous fire
departments in other cities and states, as well as the National Firefighters As-
sociation, used similar vision screens.240 The court also based its decision on
testimony that glasses could be broken or lost and that, whereas many of
Omaha's firefighters did wear glasses, they were able to remove them during
fires.241 Finally, the court considered the accommodation issue (without label-
ing it as such) by inquiring whether there was a face mask available for per-
sons wearing glasses.242
The court did not, however, consider that vision problems probably
233. Id. at 401-02, 291 N.W.2d at 853.
234. Id. at 401, 291 N.W.2d at 853. The company official's testimony was, moreover, hearsay
within hearsay. He told the court that he had been informed by a third party (at a convention)
that the latter knew of a one-handed cabdriver who had been in accidents.
235. See id. at 417-19, 291 N.W.2d at 860-61 (decision not limited to plaintiff).
236. 202 Neb. 638, 277 N.W.2d 52 (1979).
237. Id. at 640, 277 N.W.2d at 54.
238. Id. at 649, 277 N.W.2d at 58.
239. Id. at 650, 277 N.W.2d at 59.
240. See id. at 643, 277 N.W.2d at 55.
241. See id. at 64547, 277 N.W.2d at 56-57.
242. See id. at 645, 277 N.W.2d at 56.
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would be most acute inside a burning building, where even those with the
sharpest vision would suffer from stinging, watering eyes, and visibility would
be, at best, marginal. In those circumstances, it seems logical to assume that
all firefighters are forced to rely primarily on senses other than sight. More
importantly, there was no evidence that a single firefighter had ever endan-
gered himself or others because of poor vision. Widespread acceptance of vis-
ual-acuity screens proves only that the prejudice against poor vision is
widespread, not that the standards are well grounded in fact.243 Finally, be-
cause the technology pertaining to face masks is clearly an inappropriate sub-
ject for judicial notice, the court could not challenge seriously the city's claim
that existing face masks were vulnerable to smoke seepage.
Suppose, however, that it were established to the court's satisfaction that
even under conditions of poor visibility, firefighters with normal vision per-
form more safely than those with impaired vision. Suppose further that no
adequate face mask existed, and that it would be impossible or unduly bur-
densome to require the employer to devise such a mask. The case then could
have been resolved under a linear mode of analysis: 244 employment was de-
nied on the basis of handicap; the handicap was shown to impair job perform-
ance; and accommodation was not feasible. The McCrea opinion indicates no
such step-by-step analysis. Indeed, it is unclear whether plaintiff lost because
his handicap impaired job performance, because accommodation was impossi-
ble, because accommodation could not overcome safety hazards, or because it
would have been unreasonable to require the employer to accommodate him.
The visual-acuity screen in McCrea may have been valid, but it should have
been evaluated in light of accommodation possibilities. If accommodation
could eliminate the need for the screen, then the screen should not be a bar to
employment unless accommodation were shown to be unreasonable or unduly
burdensome. Under the McCrea analysis, however, it appears that the need
for the screen was accepted largely because its use was widespread, 45 and it is
not even clear whether the court believed the employer had a duty of reason-
able accommodation. 24
6
Nevertheless, McCrea does suggest that courts, regardless of the mode of
analysis they employ, are ill-equipped to evaluate safety screens because of
"the difficulty of understanding the technology necessary to alter the work-
place. ' 247 McCrea involved rather simple technology-an effective face
243. Similarly, outmoded eugenics laws, based on the belief that certain handicaps were trans-
mitted largely through heredity, were once widespread, and undoubtedly served to reinforce a
feeling that they were necessary. Today, it is becoming understood that eugenic predictions are
unreliable at best. See Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 011o ST. L.
J. 591, 603 (1966); Murdock, supra note 101, at 924-27; Note, Human Sterilization, 35 IoWA L.
REv. 251, 254 (1950).
244. See diagram, supra note 15.
245. See supra text accompanying note 240.
246. Although the court did observe that no satisfactory face mask appeared to be available, it
did not mention a duty to accommodate. See McCrea, 202 Neb. at 645, 277 N.W.2d at 56.
247. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1070.
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mask 248-but it is unlikely that the court had the expertise to evaluate that
technology. Obviously, the court's lack of expertise becomes more of a prob-
lem in cases involving sophisticated industries. In addition, employers are in a
better position than handicapped job applicants to evaluate whether technol-
ogy permits reasonable accommodation, but have no incentive to prove that
accommodation is feasible.249 Therefore, if employers assert that the technol-
ogy to permit reasonable accommodation is unavailable, courts may be forced
to take their word.
It has been suggested that, because courts are not "the most efficient
agents"250 for evaluating employment screens, the best approach would be to
create a federal agency exclusively devoted to the task.251 Given the expense
involved, however, "realistic efforts. . . may be best directed toward improve-
ments in existing agencies," 252 and toward the creation of new agencies on the
state level. At present, thirty states have established enforcement agencies to
scrutinize handicap employment discrimination claims.253 These agencies
could be given broad authority "to examine employment screens and debate
the merits of screens in rulemaking proceedings," 254 using the input of "all
concerned parties" 25 5 in "informal hearings. ' 256 As the agencies acquire a
"special familiarity" 257 with the issues, they would presumably become sensi-
tive both to industry-wide problems and the technology available to combat
them, thus rendering appropriate the setting of industry-wide standards.
Meanwhile, in the absence of expert agency evaluation, courts are faced with a
difficult task. Under no circumstances, however, should a screen be beyond
scrutiny simply because the employer has asserted a safety defense. When the
safety hazard is to the public or other employees, "efficiency considerations
may support arguments for a somewhat reduced degree of scrutiny." 258 When
the alleged danger is only to the employee, courts should scrutinize vigorously
safety screens. And if a court lacks the expertise to evaluate a screen, it should
complain to the legislature, for unless the problem is admitted, it cannot be
resolved.
Although the Boynton Cab and McCrea courts appeared willing to accept
the employers' proffered safety defenses, progressive courts, apparently eager
248. McCrea, 202 Neb. at 645, 277 N.W.2d at 56.
249. A similar problem is posed under Title VII cases. An employee attempting to show that a
hiring policy with disparate impact on a protected group is not a business necessity may offer
evidence that other selection devices without a disparate impact would serve the employer's inter-
ests just as well. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Knowledge of alterna-
tive selection devices, however, is likely to be peculiarly within the employer's reach, and he has
no reason to reveal this knowledge because it would, in effect, establish the plaintiffs case.
250. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1070.
251. Id. at 1071-72.
252. Id. at 1072.
253. See supra note 35.




258. Id. at 1068.
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to enforce antidiscrimination legislation, occasionally have failed to give the
safety defense adequate consideration. 259 The short-term result has been at-
tractive-handicapped persons have obtained employment rights-but the
end result could be entirely unsatisfactory. If an improperly placed handi-
capped person injures others, antidiscrimination legislation inevitably will
meet with increased resistance and resentment, retarding rather than advanc-
ing the cause of equal employment opportunity and causing unnecessary in-
jury in the process.
Ross v. Gama Shoes, Inc. 260 is a case in point. There, an employee with
epilepsy successfully challenged his dismissal from a position as a shoe store
salesperson. 26' The employer was aware of and sympathetic to the employee's
condition and had made no attempt to deny him employment on the basis of
presumed safety problems.262 The employee's seizures, however, were uncon-
trolled and sometimes occurred as often as three times a day.2 6 3 Moreover, the
seizures took atypical forms: on one occasion, the employee "attempted to
pull a large mirror from the wall,' '264 permanently frightening away a cus-
tomer,265 on another he grabbed his employer, causing injuries requiring med-
ical attention and resulting in lost work days;266 on still another, he squeezed
until breathless a co-worker who had just recovered from pneumonia.
267
Despite these incidents, the court did not agree with the employer that the
employee's dismissal "constituted a 'business necessity' within the meaning of
the [District of Columbia] code."268 The court reasoned that since the seizures
were purely involuntary, they "[did] not arise out of nor [were] they in further-
ance" of the employer's business. 269 Therefore, the employer could not be
held liable under the theory of respondeat superior, and firing the employee
was not a business necessity. 270 Without inquiring whether the employer
nonetheless could be held to have been negligent in employing the plaintiff,
the court observed that the shoe store business is not inherently dangerous,
and that "the risk of injury to shoe store customers or employees by an epilep-
tic salesman is not substantially greater than risk of injury to any other general
259. See infra text accompanying notes 260-301.
260. 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 150 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1980).
261. Id. at 150-52.
262. See id. at 150.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 150-51.
265. Id. at 151 (customer would not return to store while plaintiff employed there).
266. Id.
267. I'd
268. Id. (defendant alleged "business necessity"). Id at 152 (court found no "business
necessity").
269. Id at 152.
270. Id. This finding appears to be beside the point, since the issue was not whether the
employer was liable for the employee's acts, but whether the law required the employer to keep
the employee on the job. The employer, however, had argued that he would be liable for the
employee's acts, and that firing him was a business necessity to avoid damage claims in tort. See
id. The court also observed, in apparent disregard of the evidence, that "plaintiff was an asset to
the defendant and not a hindrance," id., because although plaintifis employment was becoming
increasingly problematical, he was basically a good salesman. See id.
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member of the public by epileptics in general." 271 Thus, the court inverted the
usual, and frequently invidious, reasoning through which an employee with a
handicap is excluded from employment simply because other persons with
similar handicaps are perceived to pose a safety hazard. Instead, the court
substituted a highly questionable analysis, suggesting that even though a given
individual has been shown to pose a safety hazard, he must be granted em-
ployment because other persons with similar handicaps generally pose no spe-
cial risk. Rather than speculating by reasoning from the general to the
particular, this court ignored the uncontroverted evidence272 by extending the
particular to the general.
Had the court kept in mind the unique nature of handicap legislation, the
outcome might have been different. After acknowledging that job perform-
ance was impaired, and that the handicap created safety hazards, the court
could have asked whether accommodation was possible. The record suggests
that safety hazards could not be overcome by assigning the employee to store-
room duties, because other employees could be injured there.273 The court
failed completely, however, to determine whether medical treatment could
control the employee's seizures. If it could, accommodation would have been
possible.274 If no treatment would alleviate the seizures, accommodation was
not possible. If the employee simply refused to accept treatment, the court
could have held that it would be unreasonable to require the employer to re-
tain him. By failing to examine the accommodation issue, the court sanc-
tioned a situation which posed hazards to innocent persons and seems certain
to have engendered among the employer, the co-workers, and the store's cus-
tomers prejudice toward persons with epilepsy. Although the decision was su-
perficially favorable to the handicapped person, it frustrated the goals of
antidiscrimination legislation.
Similarly, in Zorick v. Tynes275 a court's failure to consider safety factors
undermines the persuasiveness of a decision favorable to the handicapped
plaintiff.276 In Zorick a blind man was refused employment as a physical edu-
cation instructor at an elementary school.2 7 7 The court held he had no cause
of action under federal law.278 Turning to Zorick's state claim, however, the
271. Id.
272. Although there was evidence that plaintiff in many instances was an asset to the business,
see supra note 270, it was clear that plaintiff had endangered others. The court seemed to feel,
however, that the risk of harm was balanced by plaintifi's generally good performance. This anal-
ysis suggests that personal safety is no more important than mere economic considerations.
273. Ross, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 150-51.
274. Of course, a quite separate question is whether it would have been reasonable or unduly
burdensome to require the employer to pay for the employee's treatment.
275. 372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1979).
276. Id. (plaintiff won period of trial employment).
277. Id. at 136.
278. Id. at 137-41. The court found Rehabilitation Act claim defective because "no federal
court... [had] held that federal-aid recipients may not.. . enforce standards for physical capac-
ities reasonably related to the work or program concerned," id at 140, and a federal court "would
not likely regard [the] decision concerning Zorick as arbitrary, capricious, or groundlessly discrim-
inatory against the blind.' Id. at 141.
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court held Zorick was entitled to a period of trial employment. The Florida
legislature required that a handicapped person be granted employment "un-
less it is shown" 279 that the handicap impairs job performance. "These words
declare that. . . there shall be no presumption, whether rebuttable or irrebut-
table, that the physically handicapped are unable to perform satisfactorily
tasks previously reserved for the fully able-bodied. ' 280 Furthermore, the court
said, the "incapacity must be 'shown' to be that of the applicant, and that may
be shown by the employer's particularized knowledge of the work of the simi-
larly handicapped, or, lacking such experience, by testing, interview, or trial
employment of a particular applicant."'28' The court found that the decision
"to withdraw the employment offer was based, not on any identifiable experi-
ence. . . [nor] on a test or interview of Zorick or any trial of his abilities, but
on ordinary preconceptions." 282 While Zorick had not shown "that he [was]
qualified as a matter of law,"'283 he was entitled to "a trial employment of
sufficient length to dispel the preconceptions which tainted the original deci-
sion, replacing them with personalized knowledge of all relevant facts pertain-
ing to Zorick's capacity or lack of it.''284 Only the lone dissenting judge raised
safety concerns, observing that the playground in question was "adjacent to a
busy highway" 285 and warning that "tragedy [could] stalk the playground dur-
ing the 'on-job tryout.' "286
The majority and the dissent thus focused on entirely different issues. The
majority cared only whether Zorick successfully could teach physical educa-
tion and admonished the school superintendent that "a public employer exer-
cising discretion in employment decisions affecting the handicapped must take
care that the operative incapacity is not his own dearth of knowledge, experi-
ence and ingenuity." 28 7 The court demanded a "particularly informed" deci-
sion.288 The dissenting judge, by contrast, demonstrated an "operative
incapacity" to imagine that blind persons may be able to compensate for their
lack of sight by developing their other senses, 289 but he also realized that the
children's safety as well as the teacher's competence was at issue.290 In.ignor-
ing the dissenting judge's concern for the children, the majority was too sym-
pathetic to Zorick's cause. The dissent read the record to establish "that
279. Id. at 141. See FLA. STAT. § 413.08(3) (1977).
280. Zorick, 372 So. 2d at 141.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 142.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 143 (Melvin, J., dissenting).
286. Id. The judge also complained that, following Zorick, blind persons could insist on the
chance to prove themselves as firefighters or traffic-control officers. Id.
287. Id. at 141.
288. Id. at 141-42.
289. See LEGAL RiGHTS, supra note 1, at 2 n.q (list of "real life heroes" includes blind persons
Homer, Helen Keller, Joseph Pulitzer, Ray Charles).
290. The judge's primary complaint was addressed to what he percieved to be Zorick's inabil-
ity to teach. See Zorick, 372 So. 2d at 143 (Melvin, J., dissenting). He did, however, devote
almost equal space to safety concerns. Id.
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Zorick would be dependent upon other students or some other instructor to
advise him if a student decided to dart away from the playground." 291 It is
unclear whether such assistance was available to Zorick.292 Nonetheless, the
majority insisted that it must be "shown" that Zorick was "incapable, by rea-
son of his blindness, to perform satisfactorily. '293 Presumably, if a child
darted into traffic and were killed, Zorick would have been "shown" to be
"incapable." Surely, however, the majority was unwilling to pay such a high
price for its "experiment."
294
On the other hand, Zorick stands for the proposition that state statutes
may prevent handicap employment discrimination more effectively than fed-
eral law295 and represents an innovative, progressive approach to evaluating
discrimination claims. The logic of the opinion, however, is seriously flawed.
First, the Zorick court was, in a sense, merely passing the buck. "The em-
ployer's decision is still his own,' 2 9 6 the court said, and need be only "ra-
tional," 297 not "also correct and wise." 298 The school was required only to
employ Zorick, not to assist him in any way. It seems safe to assume that a
blind man, surrounded by hostile and uncooperative co-workers, could easily
be "shown" to be "incapable." Thus Zorick's trial period of employment
would be brief and unpleasant, his victory short-lived. Second, the court
could have reached the same decision, without ignoring the safety issue, by
centering its analysis on accommodation. 299 It is disingenuous to pretend that
Zorick's blindness was no obstacle to job performance. The real issue was
whether it would have been unreasonable or unduly burdensome to accommo-
date his handicap. Hence, both Zorick and Ross established faulty models for
future decisions. Because they are among the few reported employment dis-
crimination cases in which a seriously handicapped person prevailed, 3°° it is
291. Id.
292. It is not even clear from the opinion whether the playground was fenced.
293. Zorick, 372 So. 2d at 142.
294. Id. at 143 (Melvin, J., dissenting).
295. Federal legislation. . . is more cautious in terms and effect [than Florida's statute],
offering administrative and judicial remedies for systemic discrimination against quali-
fied handicapped job applicants in federally-funded state employment programs, but de-
ferring to local employment decisions that are not shown to be irrational.
Id at 135-36.
296. Id. at 141.
297. Id. at 142. By "rational," the court meant that a decision must follow an "exploration" of
"relevant facts, opposing views, and possible alternatives." Id. The court did not mean merely
that a decision must have some arguably rational basis.
298. Id.
299. The court did not mention accommodation. Interestingly, however, the decision has been
read to mean "that the requirement of reasonable accommodation [is]. . .strictly applied regard-
ing individuals with visual handicaps." Hartstein, supra note 39, at E-7. A trial period of employ-
ment is, at best, a temporary accommodation. In fact, the Zorick court did not require the school
to make any modifications in its program to accommodate Zorick.
300. Another is Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981) (severely
handicapped doctor protected under Rehabilitation Act because he had proper credentials). Cf.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (hearing-impaired nursing-school
applicant not protected, despite proper credentials, because handicap precluded finding she was
"otherwise qualified").
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unfortunate that both are analytically weak and vulnerable to attack.301
III. CONCLUSION
The obstacle to equal employment opportunity for handicapped persons
is nearly always expense. Employers reject the handicapped, fearing that in-
surance claims will be excessive,302 that their presence will discomfit custom-
ers, 303 or that they will prove inefficient. 3 4 Protective legislation may be no
more than a policy statement because the states refuse to commit resources to
an enforcement agency.305 Courts may be unwilling to order, or even to con-
sider the possibility of, accommodation because it requires an investment of
capital.3°6 Hence, the courts are faced with a dilemma. They may tell an
employer primarily concerned with profit that he must spend money to accom-
modate a handicapped applicant. Alternatively, they may tell a handicapped
person that he cannot be employed because hiring him would be too expen-
sive. This is not a pleasant choice. Not surprisingly, many courts beg the
question by instead telling plaintiff that he is not legally handicapped, 307 not
"otherwise qualified, ' 30 8 or that he poses a safety hazard.309 Frequently, the
fear that hiring a handicapped person will prove expensive is illusory.31
0
When it is, courts have a responsibility to expose the prejudices and miscon-
ceptions which operate to deny handicapped persons jobs.3 1' When that fear
has a basis in fact, however, the harsh reality must be faced: decisions not to
hire handicapped persons hinge on dollars and cents. Perhaps society's cur-
rent conviction "that an employer's private efficiency concerns must be tem-
pered by larger considerations such as fairness, autonomy, and the necessity to
301. They appear, however, to have set no precedents. Citations to Ross do not appear in the
reported cases. Zorick has been cited several times, apparently with approval, but nowhere ex-
pressly followed. See Hollis v. Florida School Bd., 384 So. 2d 661, 664 (Fla. 1980); Hurley v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757, 765 (W. Va. 1980).
302. See, eg., Wisconsin Dairy Equip. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 95 Wis. 2d 319, 322, 290 N.W.2d 330, 332 (1980) (worker with one kidney rejected
because employer feared excessive workers' compensation payments).
303. See Erf, supra note 27, at 814 (customers do not like to see handicapped workers). See
also Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981) (employer feared handi-
capped doctor would make patients uncomfortable).
304. This fear has little basis in fact. See supra text accompanying note 173.
305. Only 30 states have enforcement agencies. See supra note 35.
306. See McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1065. In addition, courts may have no
clear statutory mandate authorizing them to require accommodation. Id.
307. See Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
308. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
309. See, e.g., Boynton Cab Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 96
Wis. 2d 396, 291 N.W.2d 850 (1980).
310. In Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S,E.2d 248 (1979), for exam-
ple, there appears to be no reason to suppose that plaintiff, who had glaucoma, would have cost
the employer any more money than a nonhandicapped employee.
311. That responsibility is too often unfulfilled. In Wisconsin Dairy Equip. Co. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations, 95 Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980), for instance,
the court failed to point out that hiring a worker with one kidney would not cost the employer
more money than hiring a nonhandicapped worker, even if the man suffered a second injury
which resulted in total disability. Instead, the court merely pointed out that a second injury was
unlikely, thus creating the impression that the employer must accept the risk of excessive expense.
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expend all societal resources as efficiently as possible" 31 2 is half-hearted. If so,
handicapped people have a right to straightforward answers on this score from
the courts. Society seems to be saying, "We are willing to help you, but not if
it costs too much." Possibly putting the policy judgment in precisely those
terms will persuade us it is unpalatable. At a minimum, it should convince us
that we must begin to decide how much is too much.
PAMELA HUESSY SIMON
312. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 140, at 1075.
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